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man).Current literature maintains that success or failure in the performance of an action can modify perception
of the objects of that action. The tests of that modiﬁcation, however, may have measured memory rather
than perception. To address this issue, the current experiment had observers throw a marble into various
sized holes and assess their size through either a haptic or verbal measure. They respond either before the
throw while the hole is visible (control condition), after the throw while the hole is visible (perception
condition), or after the throw while the hole is not visible (memory condition). It was found that observ-
ers judged the hole size to be different depending on their throwing success only during the memory con-
dition. This casts doubt on the conclusion of an action-speciﬁc perception account (Witt, 2011), and
instead we propose an action-speciﬁc memory account.
Published by Elsevier Ltd.1. Introduction
This paper investigates the effect of action on cognitive pro-
cesses. While previous research has found support for such an ef-
fect (e.g., Witt et al., 2008b; Witt & Profﬁtt, 2005), none has
attempted to tease apart two main components of cognition (per-
ception and memory), either of which may be responsible for some
of the reported ﬁndings.
An explanation of how the modiﬁcation of perception and
memory is possible is provided by the theory of embodied cogni-
tion. Under this view cognition arises from the interaction of brain,
body, and environment as the organism engages in action (Gibbs,
2005), and thus can be altered by a change to any of them.
The emphasis on action in theories of cognition was pioneered
by Fitts and Seeger (1953). By comparing reaction time, speed,
and errors between differently related stimuli and responses, they
demonstrated that the link between environment and organism af-
fects action. Because this link is dependent upon environment and
organism characteristics, different opportunities for action arise as
either is changed. Gibson (1979) referred to these opportunities as
affordances, and was interested in how they informed cognition.
Because one’s abilities are dependent upon the physical and
mental ability to conduct motor action, affordances are not static.
Instead they can be altered due to mental outlook and physical
modiﬁcations, which have the potential to result in perceptual
changes. For example chronic pain is a detriment to ability. Partic-
ipants in a study by Witt et al. (2008a) were patients with chronicLtd.
Cooper), cass.sterling@gmail.
bruceb@ucsc.edu (B. Bridge-back pain and controls without such pain. When their task was to
estimate distances, the patients estimated them as signiﬁcantly
farther than did the controls, thereby tying one’s condition to dis-
tance perception. The authors believe that this modiﬁcation of per-
ception is correlated with the speciﬁc task (in this case walking)
instead of tasks in general. In other words these patients would
not be predicted to overestimate reaching judgments. Although a
follow up study was never carried out to test this, Witt, Profﬁtt,
and Epstein (2004) found that distance perception in normal peo-
ple is affected by holding heavy balls only when they intend to
throw them, as opposed to when they intend to walk (without
the ball). Therefore it appears that one’s ability to act affects the
corresponding perception, instead of perception in general.
Differences in ability also arise in organized sports. After a base-
ball game players were asked to choose from a number of ball sizes
as to the one they believed was used in the game. Those with a
high batting average (high ability) choose a larger ball than those
with a poor batting average (low ability) (Witt & Profﬁtt, 2005).
Similar results were found for golf in terms of perceived hole size.
This effect was not related to overall ability but instead to perfor-
mance during a speciﬁc game. This concept was tested further in
the lab where golf putting distance was manipulated. After putting,
people in both the close and distant conditions were placed at the
same distance from the hole they were putting to, and were asked
to judge the hole size by manipulating a circle on a computer
screen. Those in the closer condition (easier task, resulting in great-
er ability) responded with a larger circle than did those in the far
condition (harder task, resulting in lower ability) (Witt et al.,
2008b).
This effect of ability on size perception has been investigated
further by studies correlating the perceived width of doors with
the width of people (Stefanucci & Geuss, 2009), the size of goal
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eye with ability to throw darts (Wesp et al., 2004), the height of
walls with ability to climb them (Taylor, Witt, & Sugovic, 2010),
the size of target with children’s performance throwing and catch-
ing a ball (Cañal-Bruland & Van der Kamp, 2009), and the height of
a tennis net with ability to play (Witt & Sugovic, 2010). In all of
these, and previously reported size perception studies, perception
was assessed with a visual matching task or a slight variant of such
a task, which means memory may have confounded the results.
These and all other ﬁndings demonstrating the effect of action on
perception are categorized by Witt (2011) as action-speciﬁc per-
ception accounts.
While most of these action effects are truly perceptual in nature
(e.g., attention increasing spatial discrimination) and intuitively
seem to convey an evolutionary advantage (e.g., a predator grab-
bing one’s attention leading to an enhancement of visual process-
ing thereby increasing one’s chance of survival), some effects that
have been labeled perceptual would seem to be disadvantageous
and may simply be memory masquerading as perception.
One such claim, dealing with the perceived size of objects being
altered by one’s ability to act (Witt, 2011; Witt & Profﬁtt, 2005;
Witt et al., 2008b), postulates that this effect has an evolutionary
advantage: a hunter who often fails will perceive prey as smaller
than a hunter who is usually successful, and so will move closer
to get a better shot. This action-speciﬁc (size) perception account,
however, means that a successful hunter would perceive the prey
as larger, and may therefore aim wide of the actual target and miss.
It would seem, then, that size perception should be relatively
stable in order to avoid such problems. An alternative explanation
for the reported size effects is that the better hunter merely
remembers the prey as being larger and the worse hunter remem-
bers it as smaller simply as a means of subconsciously accounting
for their respective success or failure. In this case both actually per-
ceive the prey as equal in size during the hunt. Therefore this ef-
fect, and possibly many others, is in need of a more rigorous
scientiﬁc exploration that distinguishes between memory and per-
ceptual processes in order to get at the issue of what is being af-
fected by action.
Witt and Profﬁtt (2005) conclude that perception of size is inﬂu-
enced by one’s ability to successfully perform some act with the ob-
ject in question. Size judgements, however, were conducted while
the object was no longer visible. In every experiment perception
was assessed while participants were looking away from the goal
object. Even though they could look back and forth as often as they
wished from goal object to response area, and in the case of Witt
and Dorsch (2009) the visual distance from goal object to response
area was small, only a very small area of the visual ﬁeld can be per-
ceived in any amount of detail at any one time (Gregory, 1997).
Because participants never looked directly at the object in ques-
tion while making their size responses, it is possible that the out-
come of an action merely affects how one stores the object in
memory, and subsequently describes it. The exact process of this
action-dependent visual memory effect is beyond the scope of this
paper, but based on the work of Cañal-Bruland et al. (2011) we
know that the mere knowledge of success or failure at a given task
is insufﬁcient. What is required is that attention be paid to the goal
object during the action combined with the knowledge of success
or failure. This combination, therefore, may change how one thinks
about the object after the fact, as opposed to how one actually per-
ceives it during the time of action. For example, at the moment of
action, a professional baseball player perceives the ball to be the
same size as does an amateur. Only after the action occurs do the
professional and the amateur’s thoughts concerning the size of
the ball differ.
Memory is not infallible, and evidence for memory distortion
has been found in a number of studies including the recollectionof stories over time (Bartlett, 1932), the report of experienced
events after receiving misleading information (Loftus & Pickrell,
1995; Nourkova, Bernstein, & Loftus, 2004; Sacchi, Agnoli, & Loftus,
2007), the illusory recollection of words that were never presented
(Payne et al., 1996; Read, 1996), and the illusory recollection of
performing an action that was never performed (Goff & Roediger,
1998). Visual details of a scene are subject to a similar fate.
Evidence of poorly remembered scene details comes from studies
on change blindness: participants rarely notice changes to a scene
after a real or implied saccade (Rensink, O’Regan, & Clark, 1997)
when gist is held constant (Sampanes, Tseng, & Bridgeman, 2008).
In order to determine whether action affects size perception or
visual memory, the present study assigns both as independent
variables when reporting the size of objects. Perception is assessed
when a participant is looking at the object in question while giving
their report, and visual memory is assessed when the participant
can no longer see the object while giving their report. The experi-
mental design is between subjects, with participants randomly as-
signed to Experiment and Condition. Two types of reports are used,
haptic and verbal.2. Experiment 1: Haptic measure
Participants threw a marble into one of three different sized
holes presented in a random order. They were asked to indicate
how large they perceived the hole to be, using their non-dominant
hand. The purpose of this experiment was to determine whether
perceived hole size reported haptically can be altered by success
in completing an action.
2.1. Method
2.1.1. Participants
One-hundred and four (52 males, 52 females) undergraduate
students volunteered in exchange for course credit. Thirty-four
(15 females, 19 males) were assigned to the control condition, 35
(20 females, 15 males) to the perception condition, and 35 (17 fe-
males, 18 males) to the memory condition. They all threw with
their dominant hand, had normal or corrected-to-normal vision,
and, as assessed by a questionnaire at the conclusion of the study
asking for their technique in reporting hole size, were unaware of
the purpose of the experiment.
2.1.2. Apparatus and stimuli
Participants sat in a chair facing the hole they were throwing to.
The distance between their eyes and the hole was 1.38 m. Each
hole was drilled into the center of a 390 mm by 110 mm by
12.7 mm wood board. The board slid into the front of a box sitting
on a 77 cm tall table. A black curtain hung 16 cm in front of the box
and covered it completely when down. An X was marked in white
tape on the curtain, directly behind which the hole in the board ap-
peared when the curtain was raised. Three boards, with hole diam-
eters of 53 mm, 56 mm, and 59 mm, were used. All boards were
painted ﬂat white, while the box that holds the boards in place
was covered in white duct tape.
Participants threw a marble with their dominant hand at each
hole when it was presented. Immediately before or after their
throw (depending on the condition), they indicated with their
non-dominant hand how large they perceived the hole to be. To
aid in the assessment of this measurement, their foreﬁnger and
thumb were marked with a black dot from a Sharpie pen at the
point on their skin next to the inside corner of their nails. During
the experiment, the participant’s hand was placed on a 20 cm by
25 cm measuring board, on a table 60 cm high. On one side of
the board, the participant’s thumb and foreﬁnger were placed
Fig. 1. Example of participant in ready position with hole (a) covered and (b) revealed.
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served as their starting position. On the opposite side of the mea-
suring board a camera was mounted to record participants’ hand
measurements. The perceived hole size was computed by noting
the distance between the black dot on the participant’s foreﬁnger
and thumb with respect to the measuring tape.2.1.3. Procedure
After participants were seated they underwent a Pre-Practice to
show them how the measurement part of the experiment worked.
They were shown ten different sized circles drawn on paper, which
ranged from 20 mm to 90 mm in diameter. When the circle was
presented, they were to extend their foreﬁnger and thumb apart
from each other on the measuring device until the perceived diam-
eter of the circle shownwas reached. This distance was assessed by
the experimenter, who then informed the participant of their mea-
surement, and the actual size of the circle. This was done for every
circle presented for a total of ten trials.
Next participants underwent Practice, which was designed to
get them accustomed to the procedure of the experiment. Partici-
pants were presented with the boards to be used in the actual
experiment (1–3). No feedback was given concerning the correct
size of the hole. Instead feedback was given about the correct
mechanics of each throw and measurement.
Before each board was revealed, participants were to hold the
marble in their dominant hand while gripping the thumbtack on
the measuring board with their non-dominant hand. Their marble
holding arm was outstretched towards the white X on the curtain.
When the hole was revealed the participants cocked back their arm
and threw the marble towards the hole (Fig. 1). In the control con-
dition they measured with their non-dominant hand once the hole
was revealed, and threw immediately afterwards. In the perception
condition they measured immediately after they threw but while
the hole was still revealed. In the memory condition they mea-
sured after they threw and immediately after the hole was covered
by the curtain. After 10 practice trials and the subjects felt comfort-
able with the procedure they moved onto the actual experiment,
which did not differ in instruction from the practice. Here each
board was presented 10 times in random order for a total of 30 tri-
als per participant.To code the results, two raters watched the video of every mea-
surement on a Mac desktop computer and assessed the distance
between thumb and foreﬁnger based on the ruler upon which
the participant’s hand rested. The observers were blind as to con-
dition and whether the throw was a make or a miss.
2.2. Results/discussion
Anyone who was successful with less than 20% of their throws
was eliminated due to a lack of comparison data between makes
and misses. This accounted for one person in the perception condi-
tion. One person was also removed in the control condition due to
the experimenters’ inability to view their ﬁngers during recording.
The average of the three holes used was 56 mm, and the average
reported hole size of all three holes (overall average) was
47.89 mm in the control condition, 50.0 mm in the perception con-
dition, and 50.2 mm in the memory condition. The overall average
percentage of successful throws for the control condition was
58.2%, perception condition was 53.1%, and memory was 52.6%.
The overall percentage of successful throws and the overall
average reported hole size were both analyzed between conditions
to test for possible confounds. No signiﬁcant differences were
found between conditions for overall percentage of successful
throws (F(2, 99) = 1.659, p = .196, g2 = .032) or overall reported
hole size (F(2, 99) = .593, p = .555, g2 = .012).
A between-subjects correlation of average reported hole size
with percentage of successful throws for each condition was calcu-
lated. There was no signiﬁcant correlation in the control condition
(Pearson’s Correlation (2-tailed) = .181, N = 34, p = .306), percep-
tion condition (Pearson’s Correlation (2-tailed) = .108, N = 34,
p = .542), or memory condition (Pearson’s Correlation (2-tailed) =
.082, N = 34, p = .645).
To compare reported hole size between the control, perception,
and memory conditions when a throw was successful versus when
it failed on a trial by trial basis we analyzed each participant’s
successful minus failed throws for holes 1, 2, and 3. The overall
average response for successful versus unsuccessful throws in
the control condition was 47.6 mm and 48.2 mm respectively,
the perception condition was 50.2 mm and 49.7 mm respectively,
and the memory condition was 51.2 mm and 48.8 mm respec-
tively. There was a signiﬁcant effect of success minus failure
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Fig. 2. Average responses of success minus failure across participants as a function of control, perception, and memory conditions of the haptic experiment.
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comparisons using the Tukey HSD test indicated that the mean
score of success minus failure for the memory condition
(M = .237, SE = .055) was signiﬁcantly different from the perception
condition (M = .043, SE = .055) (p = .036) and control condition
(M = .058, SE = .055) (p = .001) (Fig. 2).
We found no relationship between overall performance during
a throwing task and the resulting perception or visual memory of
the target object when the response was haptic. We did ﬁnd evi-
dence that visual memory for the target was altered on a trial by
trial basis in a manner dependent upon successful or failed action,
but we found no evidence that this was the case for perception.
Furthermore, the memory effect was not due to an inherent con-
found between conditions, but was instead due to differences be-
tween successful and failed actions on a trial by trial basis.3. Experiment 2: Verbal measure
Participants threw a marble into one of seven holes of differing
size presented randomly. They measured how large they perceived
the hole to be with verbal report. The purpose of this experiment
was to determine whether perceived hole size reported verbally
can be altered by one’s successful versus unsuccessful completion
of an action, based on evidence that under some conditions verbal
and motor measures of the same stimulus situation can yield dif-
ferent results (Bridgeman, Peery, & Anand, 1997).
3.1. Method
3.1.1. Participants
One-hundred and ﬁfteen undergraduate students (32 males, 83
females) volunteered in exchange for course credit. 38 (29 females,
9 males) were assigned to the control condition, 38 (27 females, 11
males) to the perception condition, and 39 (27 females, 12 males)
to the memory condition. They all threw with their dominant
hand, had normal or corrected-to-normal vision, and, as assessed
by a questionnaire at the conclusion of the study asking for their
technique in reporting hole size, were unaware of the purpose of
the experiment.
3.1.2. Apparatus and stimuli
Apparatus and stimuli were the same as in experiment one ex-
cept that we used seven boards with hole diameters of 47 mm,
50 mm, 53 mm, 56 mm, 59 mm, 62 mm, and 65 mm.
Participants threw a marble with their dominant hand at each
hole when it was presented. Immediately before or after theirthrow (depending on condition), they verbally reported how large
they perceived the hole to be, where #1 was the smallest and #7
was the largest possible hole size.3.1.3. Procedure
Participants were ﬁrst shown seven drawn circles of the same
sizes as the seven holes to be used in the actual experiment, and
inside each circle was the number that corresponded to it (1–7).
They were presented on a 75 cm by 39 cm paper, with the largest
(7) on top and the smallest (1) on the bottom.
Participants were then seated and underwent Pre-Practice,
analogous to that in Experiment 1. They were presented with a
board with one of the seven hole sizes, and were asked to report
its size on a 1–7 scale. Each hole was presented once. Participants
were given feedback as to the correctness of their assessment.
Next participants underwent Practice, where they learned how
to throw the marble and verbally report the hole size. No feedback
was given concerning the correct size of the hole. Instead feedback
was given about the correct mechanics of each throw and verbal
measurement.
The motor practice and experimental procedures were the same
as in experiment 1, with the exception that each board was pre-
sented seven times in random order for a total of 49 trials per
participant.3.2. Results/discussion
Anyone who was successful with less than 20% of their throws
was eliminated due to a lack of comparison data between makes
and misses. This accounted for one person in the perception condi-
tion and two people in the memory condition. Also anyone who
was never successful or always successful when hole 4 was pre-
sented (the hole of interest in this experiment) was eliminated
due to a lack of data for subsequent analyses. This accounted for
eight people in the control condition, four in the perception condi-
tion, and two in the memory condition.
Holes 1–3 and 5–7 were used to provide a range of possible ver-
bal responses, but their analysis in this study is confounded with
their respective closeness to the edge of this range. When pre-
sented, these holes do not have an equal probability of being re-
ported as larger or smaller than they actually are, but instead
carry with them an initial confound of being closer to the higher
end of the range (holes 5–7) or to the lower end of the range (holes
1–3). For example, a hole of size 6 has ﬁve possibilities of being re-
ported as smaller than it is, and only one possibility of being re-
ported as larger than it is. This issue is even more apparent with
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Fig. 3. Average responses of success minus failure across participants as a function of control, perception, and memory conditions of the verbal experiment.
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of available smaller or larger size possibilities (being in the middle
of the range), it is the only one that will be analyzed here. This was
not an issue with Experiment 1 because each participant’s re-
sponse to a particular hole (indicated by thumb and foreﬁnger)
was not dependent upon a predetermined range.
Hole number 4 is 56 mm in diameter. After all hole size reports
were translated to an actual diameter, the average for reported
hole size in the control condition was 55.9 mm, perception was
56.0 mm, and memory was 56.2 mm. The average percentage suc-
cess for the control condition was 37.6%, perception condition was
37.2%, and memory condition was 42.9%.
The overall percentage of successful throws and the average re-
ported hole size were both compared between conditions to test
for possible confounds. No signiﬁcant differences between condi-
tions for overall percentage of successful throws (F(2, 95) = .826,
p = .441, g2 = .017) or reported hole size (F(2, 95) = .130, p = .878.
g2 = .003) were found.
A between-subjects correlation of average reported hole size
with percentage of successful throws for each condition was calcu-
lated. There was no signiﬁcant correlation in the control condition
(Pearson’s Correlation (2-tailed) = .297, N = 30, p = .111), percep-
tion condition (Pearson’s Correlation (2-tailed) = .065, N = 33, p =
.72), or memory condition (Pearson’s Correlation (2-tailed) = .047,
N = 35, p = .789).
To compare reported hole size between the control, perception,
and memory conditions when a throw was successful versus when
it failed on a trial by trial basis we analyzed each participant’s suc-
cessful minus failed throws. The average response for successful
versus unsuccessful throws in the control condition was 55.7 mm
and 56.0 mm respectively, the perception condition was 55.7 mm
and 56.0 mm respectively, and the memory condition was
56.7 mm and 55.8 mm respectively. There was a signiﬁcant effect
of success minus failure between conditions (F(2, 95) = 4.385,
p = .015, g2 = .085). Post hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test
indicated that the mean score of success minus failure for the
memory condition (M = .981, SD = 1.84) was signiﬁcantly different
from the perception condition (M = .339, SD = 2.08) (p = .025) and
control condition (.257, SD = 2.26) (p = .045) (Fig. 3).
We found no relationship between a person’s overall perfor-
mance during a throwing task and their resulting perception or
memory of the target object when the response was verbal. We
did ﬁnd evidence that memory for the target was altered on a trial
by trial basis in a manner dependent upon the successful or failed
action, but found no evidence that this was the case for perception.
Furthermore, the memory effect found was not due to an inherent
confound between conditions, but was instead due to differences
between successful and failed actions on a trial by trial basis.4. General discussion
According to Witt (2011) the high ability participants in their
studies perceived the goal object to be larger at the time of suc-
cessfully performing the respective action for each experiment.
This would predict that high ability participants as assessed by
performance in the present study would perceive a larger hole than
those of low ability, and this would be reﬂected in their size
judgments.
In both experiments one and two, perception and memory were
not found to correlate with overall ability as assessed by the per-
centage of successful throws made by each participant. This dem-
onstrates that overall performance of a series of actions does not
have an effect on the perception or memory of the goal object
being used. An explanation as to why we found no effect at all
for this analysis is given below.
Because of our experimental setup, we were also able to inves-
tigate ability’s effect on size perception and memory on a trial-by-
trial basis across all participants. Here it was found that ability af-
fects the memory, but not the perception, of each individual action
in a manner dependent upon success or failure. This explains why
we found no effect of overall performance on participant responses
while Witt and Profﬁtt (2005), Witt et al. (2008b), and Witt and
Dorsch (2009) did. In conditions where an effect was found they
had participants respond only after all of the action was completed.
Those who performed better would therefore be more likely to
have successfully completed their last action, and so would re-
spond with a larger size judgment than those who performed
worse, who were more likely to have failed their last action. In
accordance with the present study, those experiments were effec-
tively testing only the last action performance instead of the over-
all performance. Therefore our results do not conﬂict in this regard.
It must be noted, however, that Wesp et al. (2004) found an ef-
fect for overall performance and reported hole size after the partic-
ipant’s ﬁrst make. Because of their experimental setup, those who
were poor at the task would be more likely to miss many shots be-
fore ﬁnally making it and reporting. Therefore it’s possible that
these multiple failures in the beginning of the task affect memory
more profoundly than the one success. Perhaps the act of respond-
ing after every shot, as was done in the present experiment, wipes
the emotional slate clean, and participants can act and respond in a
fresh way every time. This emotional baggage theory may provide
a more satisfactory explanation for Witt and Profﬁtt (2005), Witt
et al. (2008b), and Witt and Dorsch (2009) ﬁndings as well.
Cañal-Bruland et al. (2011), however, also tested size perception
after the ﬁrst make and did not ﬁnd a correlation between number
of attempts and reported size. The reason for this discrepancy be-
tween Wesp et al. (2004) and Cañal-Bruland et al. (2011) is not
240 A.D. Cooper et al. / Vision Research 62 (2012) 235–240clear, and more research on the effect of response frequency is
needed to verify the emotional baggage theory.
The fact that we did not ﬁnd evidence for an effect on percep-
tion in either the overall or trial-by-trial ability analysis goes coun-
ter to the action-speciﬁc perception account proposed by Witt
(2011). Her theory that perception is shaped by one’s ability to
act is not supported by the present ﬁndings. What is supported,
is an action-speciﬁc visual memory account, where one’s success-
ful versus unsuccessful action alters the memory for the objects
used during the action.
More research is needed to determine whether the stored rep-
resentation of the goal object is altered by (1) the success or failure
of the action, (2) the transfer of stored information from memory
to size report, or (3) some other response bias or demand charac-
teristic is the cause of the size effect found. It should also be noted
that the conclusions reached in the present paper only concern size
reports in regards to objects in near space. Experiments by Witt
(2011) concerning distance perception being affected by ability,
for example, are quite robust, even when participants are looking
directly at the goal object while giving their reports. Woods, Phil-
beck, and Danoff (2009) and Durgin et al. (2009) have found, how-
ever, that distance reports in some of Witt’s (2011) studies appear
to be inﬂuenced by verbal instruction instead of perception. This
contradiction between distance and size perception and the possi-
ble confound of response bias remains unclear, and should be fur-
ther investigated.
In summary, because all research claiming to ﬁnd evidence for
the malleability of size perception suffers from the possible con-
found of memory, the more parsimonious conclusion from those
studies and the present study is that action affects memory and/
or the reporting of goal objects on an action-by action basis. An ef-
fect of action on memory rather than perception remains a signif-
icant insight into human action planning, however, and does not
diminish the importance of earlier experiments ﬁnding effects of
action on subsequent psychophysical measures. This conclusion
adds further evidence to our understanding of just how dynamic
memory really is, and how perception reliably delivers size proper-
ties of the world regardless of motor ability. Future research is
needed to investigate the speciﬁcs of this size memory effect to an-
swer lingering uncertainties, such as where along the route from
encoding to reporting it occurs, and why some perceptual proper-
ties of the world seem to be ﬂexible (e.g., distance) while others do
not (e.g., size).
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